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Abstract
Many automation technologies using software are making humans 
convenient. One of these technologies is to collect data through 
cameras and sensors that are common in personal life and 
automatically recognize human and human activities. The goal 
of automation is to analyze the various types of big data that are 
difficult to perform mechanical data mining. Raw data collected from 
cameras and sensors are nothing but big data before analysis. In this 
case, how to protect data by secure storage is the most important 
issue. However, when the context-aware semantic information such 
as a specific person and his behavior is extracted from the analysis, 
the security sensitivity is increased. In other words, the secondary 
information generated by interpreting and extracting personal 
location and behavioral information contained in images and videos 
is linked to other personal information, causing privacy infringement 
issues. Privacy issues become important because there is a lot of 
software that everyone can access. Therefore, it is necessary to 
study privacy protection methods in the automatic recognition of 
human and human activities. This paper analyzes the cutting-edge 
research trends, techniques, and issues of privacy-preserving 
human and human activity recognition.
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As more and more data is collected and the 
technology to process it develops, the importance 
of data is growing. In addition, technology is needed 
for sensitive data processing to protect privacy. All 
processes that process data, such as raw data, data 
being processed, and result data, require privacy. 
The general approaches to prevent privacy leakage 
adopted anonymity, access control, and transparency 
(Haris et al., 2014). With the introduction of machine 
learning (ML), big data processing is in full swing, but 
the task of privacy protection remains.
Machine learning technology has been actively 
introduced in big data processing, and applied in 
many applications where mechanical data mining 
is difficult. However, privacy concerns are raised in 
applications that extract information through deep 
learning (Tanuwidjaja et al., 2019). Privacy protection 
is essential as the application of deep learning is 
expanded from medical applications that process 
sensitive information such as patient diseases 
(Tanuwidjaja et al., 2019) to applications that analyze 
data collected by cameras and sensors to extract 
personal information (Wang et al., 2019).
There are several concerns that the machine 
learning approach can violate the user’s privacy; Figure 
1 shows a machine learning process (Osia et al., 2018), 
and Figure 2 shows privacy issues during the machine 
learning process in Figure 1. Privacy may be violated 
when: (i) data holder shares a public data set: anonymity 
of individuals are threatened; (ii) data holders participate 
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in a model training procedure with their private data; 
(iii) a model provider shares a publicly learned model: 
the privacy of the individuals’ data used for training is 
at risk; (iv) an end user shares his/her data with the 
service provider: private information can be revealed 
to the service provider; (v) a service provider shares 
query answers with the end user: an attacker can infer 
the model itself by launching repeated queries.
In the field of vision-based machine learning, 
many studies have shown serious privacy concerns 
as described in Table 1.
On the other hand, collaborative machine learning 
and federated learning allow multiple participants, 
each with his/her own training dataset, to build a joint 
model by training locally and periodically exchanging 
model updates (Melis et al., 2018). The updates 
can leak unintended information about participants’ 
training data, and passive and active inference 
attacks can exploit this leakage as shown in Figure 3.
In addition, with big data processing, both 
population privacy and individual privacy become 
important (Cormode et al., 2012). Population privacy 
is violated by disclosing that some specific people 
are highly susceptible to a given genetic condition 
and individual privacy is violated by disclosing that 
a specific patient has that condition. In general 
applications, it is difficult to hide all the information 
in big data with cryptography because it is resource 
constraint and overly complex. Instead, many 
approaches have chosen to remove the sensitive 
parts of the information, while at the same time 
preserving the necessary information for further 
analysis (Osia et al., 2020).
Privacy protection is especially important in the 
field of dealing with human-related data. Machine 
learning has widely been applied to the recognition of 
human and human activity.
Human recognition is known as very useful in 
many application domains, for example, autonomous 
driving, post-disaster rescue, automated surveillance, 
military and robotics services (Gajjar et al., 2017). 
Human face recognition is another well-known 
application to search specific person in videos or in 
the list of images. Sensor data other than images or 
Table 1. Privacy concerns in vision-based machine learning.
Research Application domain Privacy concerns
Chattopadhyay and 
Boult (2007)
Intelligent surveillance system Conflict between the purpose of intelligent 
surveillance systems and the privacy of individuals
Wu et al. (2018) Smart camera application Private information leakage during device-captured 
visual data upload to centralized cloud for analysis
Gomathisankaran et al. 
(2013)
Medical image analysis on the 
Cloud
Private information leakage of medical data 
transmitted in the network and processed in the 
cloud
Shokri et al. (2017) ‘Machine learning as a service’ 
provided by Google and Amazon
Information leakage about training datasets
Speciale et al. (2019) Augmented/Mixed reality (AR/MR) 
and autonomous robotic system
Confidential information disclosure about captured 
3D scene
Figure 1: A machine learning process 
(Osia et al., 2018).
Figure 2: Privacy issues during the 
machine learning process in Figure 1.
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videos can be used to determine if there is no human 
being. However, videos or images are commonly 
used to track and recognize specific persons and 
human diseases. Videos and images are sensitive 
data because they directly demonstrate human 
characteristics. Even if the original big data such as 
images or videos are stored safely, the secondary 
information extracted by the deep learning processing 
also has the risk of leakage of private information. In 
the medical field, automated analysis technology is 
utilized for disease diagnosis and tracking. Personal 
disease information is also concerned about the 
invasion of privacy because the secondary semantic 
information is extracted through deep learning for 
diagnosis.
Recently, human activity recognition has been 
utilized in many applications such as smart homes, 
healthcare, and manufacturing. Human activity is 
mainly recognized by cameras or sensors (Chen et al., 
2020). Cameras and sensors are embedded in not 
only many large electronic systems, such as vehicles, 
home appliances, and surveillance systems, but also 
many portable Internet of Things (IoT) devices and 
wearable devices, such as smartphones, watches, 
and fitbits. These devices are spreading for anyone to 
access, so they can collect personal-area data easily 
and that data can be used to recognize the human 
activity. In human activity recognition, sensor-based 
approaches have been used more than video-based 
approaches due to privacy concerns when placing 
cameras in human personal spaces. However, data 
about user behavior that is continuously measured 
and generated by user-friendly IoT devices (Iwasawa 
et al., 2017) allow adversary to infer private information 
about the user such as age, gender (Lu et al., 2013; 
Jain and Kanhangad, 2016), or possibly levels of 
health (Iwasawa et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018).
Privacy issues become important because there 
is much software for automatic processing of big 
data, and this software is easily accessible to anyone. 
And, anyone can collect big data about human 
and human activities. The human can be me or my 
family. Therefore, it is necessary to study the privacy 
protection methods in the automatic recognition of 
human and human activities. This paper analyzes the 
cutting-edge research trends, techniques, and issues 
of privacy-preserving human and human activity 
recognition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
in the second section, the human recognition is 
analyzed in terms of its applications, its approaches, 
and its privacy vulnerability. In the third section, the 
human activity recognition is analyzed in terms of 
its applications, its approaches, and its privacy 
vulnerability. In the fourth section, privacy-preserving 
approaches to human and human activity recognition 
are discussed. In the fifth section, we conclude this 
paper and briefly discuss the possible future work 
directions.
Human recognition and  
privacy issues
Table 2 shows recent research on human recognition 
and related privacy issues. In the deep learning-
based approaches, privacy issues exist.
Most human detection tasks are still based on 
visual images (Hwang et al., 2015). Many intelligent 
and complex video surveillance systems show a 
double-edged sword, high performance in detection, 
and privacy protection. When photos or images are 
recorded and processed by the surveillance system, 
the individuals and groups taken in the photos or 
images may be exposed unintentionally and analyzed 
differently from the system’s original purpose 
(Chattopadhyay and Boult, 2007; Ren et al., 2016; Wu 
et al., 2018) as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 3: An inference attack model against collaborative learning (Melis et al., 2018).
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Table 2. Human recognition.
Research Object
Recognition 
methods
Data
Application 
domain
Privacy 
issue
Chattopadhyay and Boult 
(2007) Wu et al. (2018) Facial 
Network, Ren et al. (2016)
Human, object Deep learning Image, 
video
Video surveillance Public dataset 
privacy 
User data 
privacy
Song and Shmatikov (2020) 
Nelus and Martin (2019)
Human face Deep learning Image Binary gender 
classification
Model privacy
Haris et al. (2014)  Gajjar et al. 
(2017) Nike, Malinowski (2010)
Human location Deep learning Sensor 
data
Location-based 
services, mobile 
heath applications
Public dataset 
privacy 
User data 
privacy
Gomathisankaran et al. (2013) 
Wang et al. (2014) Ertin et al. 
(2011)
Human disease, 
human health
Deep learning Clinical 
records, 
image
Medical care Public dataset 
privacy 
User data 
privacy
Figure 4: Object detection (Ren et al., 
2016).
Song and Shmatikov (2020) and Nelus and Martin 
(2019) introduced overlearning. That is, a model 
trained for a seemingly simple objective implicitly 
learns to recognize attributes and concepts sensitive 
from privacy. For example, a binary gender classifier 
of facial images also learns to recognize races – even 
races that are not represented in the training data – 
and identities.
Gajjar et al. (2017) detected and tracked human 
in video surveillance using histogram of oriented 
gradients (HOG) features. Nike and Malinowski (2010) 
track user’s activities by using GPS and other sensors 
on mobile devices.
Gomathisankaran et al. (2013) considered privacy 
leakage during medical image processing. Wang et al. 
(2014) detected the mental health, performance, and 
behavioral trends of the students by using sensing 
data from the smartphone. Ertin et al. (2011) tried 
to understand the psychological state of the user in 
real time by using the sensors to record physiological 
data.
Human activity recognition  
and privacy issues
Table 3 shows recent research on human activity 
recognition and related privacy issues.
Iwasawa et al. (2017) showed that deep neural 
networks (DNN) can reveals user-discriminative 
features unintentionally. DNN has the black-box 
property, it is hard to predict what DNN learns from 
training data. In other words, DNN can learn about 
the user information, the application gets to disclose 
the information unintentionally without the user’s 
consent. You et al. (2012) proposed Carsafe as an 
application that learns the driving behaviors of users 
by using the two cameras.
Chen et al. (2018), Hu et al. (2019), and Zhang 
et al. (2019) considered that the collected time series 
data are shared to infer the users’ physical activities 
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as shown in Figure 5, the personal information can 
also be inferred from the same data that is used for 
activity recognition. This is because people show 
characteristics of activity according to personal facts 
like age, gender, and so on (Lu et al., 2013; Jain and 
Kanhangad, 2016).
Phan et al. (2016) collected health social network 
data and considered privacy preservation.
Privacy-preserving approaches to  
human and human activity  
recognition
This section analyzes and summarizes privacy-
preserving approaches in human and human activity 
recognition. Many studies utilize compound methods 
to protect human-related privacy. Recently, while 
utilizing deep learning in human and human activity 
recognition, the privacy-preserving approaches show 
the direction to address privacy leakage related to 
the characteristics of deep learning additionally. 
In Table 4, privacy issues and privacy-preserving 
approaches raised in recent studies are analyzed.
Garcia and Jacobs (2010) and Fontaine and 
Galand (2007) proposed complete data isolation 
using cryptography. Garcia and Jacobs (2010) and 
Gomathisankaran et al. (2013) adopted homomorphic 
encryption (HE). Sensitive data are processed encry-
pted and there is no information leakage in the process 
as shown in Figure 6 (El-Yahyaoui and Ech-Cherif 
El Kettani, 2019). There is an approach to encrypt 
sensitive areas in images or videos as shown in 
Figure 7 (Chattopadhyay and Boult, 2007).
On the other hand, anonymized videos are 
intentionally captured or processed to be in special 
low quality conditions that only allow for the 
recognition of some target events or activities (Butler 
et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2015; Ryoo et al., 2017; Ren 
et al., 2018) as shown in Figure 8. And, Winkler et al. 
(2014) introduced cartoon-like effects as shown in 
Figure 9. Speciale et al. (2019) protected confidential 
information about the captured 3D scene by lifting 
the map representation from a 3D point cloud to a 
3D line cloud. In Figure 10, (a) shows that 3D point 
cloud reveals potentially confidential information 
in the scene. In contrast, (b) protects user privacy 
by concealing the scene geometry and preventing 
inversion attacks, while still enabling accurate and 
efficient localization.
Table 3. Human activity recognition.
Research Object
Recognition 
methods
Data
Application 
domain
Privacy  
issue
Iwasawa et al. (2017) 
You et al. (2012)
Human 
activity
Deep learning Sensor data from 
smart wearable 
devices
Daily activity 
investigation
Training data 
privacy 
User data privacy
Chen et al. (2018)  
Hu et al. (2019)  
Zhang et al. (2019)
Physical 
activities such 
as walking 
and running
Deep learning Time series sensor 
data from smart 
wearable devices
Daily activity 
investigation
User data privacy
Phan et al. (2016) Human 
activity
Deep learning Physical activities, 
biomarkers, biometric 
measures
Health social 
network
Training data 
privacy
Figure 5: Sensor-based human activity 
recognition (Hu et al., 2019).
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Table 4. Privacy-preserving approaches.
Research Privacy issue
Privacy-preserving 
approach
Protected object
Garcia and Jacobs (2010) 
Fontaine and Galand (2007) 
Gomathisankaran et al. 
(2013) Chattopadhyay and 
Boult (2007)
Private information 
leakage (Public dataset 
privacy) (User data 
privacy)
Cryptography Private information (medical 
image, lifestyle, financial 
information, face, private 
location, biometric information, 
disease information), Human 
activity (daily life activity, 
movement)
Butler et al. (2015) Dai et al. 
(2015) Ryoo et al. (2017) 
Ren et al. (2018) Winkler 
et al. (2014) Speciale et al. 
(2019)
Private information 
leakage (Public dataset 
privacy)(User data privacy)
Anonymized videos
Garcia Lopez et al. (2015) Private information 
leakage from database 
(Public dataset 
privacy)(User data privacy)
Local processing
Liu (2019) Bun and Steinke 
(2016)
Information leakage from 
large-scale database 
(Public dataset privacy)
Differential privacy
Bian et al. (2020) Information leakage in 
visual recognition(Public 
dataset privacy)(Training 
data privacy)
Secure inference 
by homomorphic 
encryptionSecret 
sharingHomomorphic 
convolution
Iwasawa et al. (2017) Ajakan 
et al. (2015) Edwards and 
Storkey (2016) Malekzadeh 
et al. (2018, 2019) Osia  
et al. (2020)
Information disclosure 
by unintentional 
discriminating of user 
information during deep 
learning (Training data 
privacy)
Adversarial training
Zhang et al. (2019) Adversarial training which 
is effective on particular 
sensitive attributes 
(Training data privacy)
Image style 
transformation
Phan et al. (2016) Abadi 
et al. (2016) Papernot et al. 
(2017)
Information leakage during 
deep learning (Training 
data privacy)
Differential privacy
Tramèr et al. (2016) Wang 
and Gong (2018) Juuti 
et al. (2019) Kariyappa and 
Kariyappa (2019)
Information leakage during 
deep learning (Model 
privacy)
Analyze attacker’s 
queries, Defense 
against attacks
And, Garcia Lopez et al. (2015) proposed edge 
computing for processing isolation; processing 
is performed near the data collected as shown 
in Figure 11. Central computing is a technique 
for collecting data in a central data center and 
performing intensive processing. In contrast, edge 
computing is a technology that processes data from 
a user’s device or near the point, where data are 
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collected or where these are collected or generated. 
Because data are analyzed immediately at the edge, 
where data are collected and applied to the field, 
these are evaluated as a computing technology 
that can ensure immediate response and reliability 
rather than using a central data center such as 
Figure 6: Homomorphic encryption 
(El-Yahyaoui and Ech-Cherif El Kettani, 
2019).
Figure 7: Sensitive areas are encrypted 
in the image (Chattopadhyay and Boult, 
2007).
Figure 8: Anonymized images: different modified pictures of the same person (Ren et al., 2018).
Figure 9: A cartooning image (Winkler 
et al., 2014).
the cloud (Xiao et al., 2019). That is, compared 
to central computing, edge computing supports 
a wide range of device mobility, has a low risk of 
data center hacking by distributed data processing, 
and has a short delay in data transmission and 
response for data processing. Central computing 
has an advantage in high-performance processing 
of big data, but edge computing is more efficient for 
applications that are sensitive to network failures or 
delays, such as autonomous vehicles, drones, or 
airplane engines.
Liu (2019) and Bun and Steinke (2016) provided 
a strong privacy guarantee by confusing a statistical 
query response drawn from a population-scale 
database by adding noise. They preserved that 
the presence or absence of a user in the database 
by differential privacy (Dwork, 2008) as shown in 
Figure 12 (Wood et al., 2018). By differential privacy, 
the general information for the entire population in a 
data set can be obtained without revealing individual 
information. In Figure 12, the difference between the 
analysis result for real-world data set and the analysis 
result for X’s opt-out data set is at most ε. This means 
that private information can be shielded at statistical 
database analysis. It is based on ε-differential privacy 
(Dwork, 2008). By injecting random noise into the 
released statistical results computed from the un-
derlying sensitive data, such that the distribution of 
the noisy results is relatively insensitive to any change 
of a single record in the original data set.
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 3D Point Cloud : Traditional  3D Line Cloud : Proposed (a) (b)
Figure 10: A user privacy protection in image-based localization (Speciale et al., 2019).
Figure 11: Central computing versus edge computing.
Figure 12: Differential privacy (Wood et al., 2018).
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Bian et al. (2020) proposed a combined approach 
for privacy-preserving image recognition using 
homomorphic encryption, secret sharing proto col, 
and homomorphic convolution.
As privacy protection approaches for deep learning, 
Iwasawa et al. (2017), Malekzadeh et al. (2018, 2019), 
Ajakan et al. (2015), Edwards and Storkey (2016), 
and Osia et al. (2020) proposed adversarial trainings 
to suppress the information disclosure. Ajakan et al. 
(2015) and Edwards and Storkey (2016) introduced 
an adversarial training framework, domain-adversarial 
neural network (DANN), and adversarial learned fair 
representations (ALFR) to remove sensitive information 
from representations each. Adversarial training 
increases robustness by augmenting training data 
with adversarial examples because machine learning 
models are often vulnerable to adversarial examples, 
maliciously perturbed inputs designed to mislead a 
model at test time (Tramer et al., 2018). Iwasawa et al. 
(2017) proposed an adversarial training framework 
with information sou rces categorized into multiple 
features rather than binary features; DANN and ALFR 
used binary fea tures. Malekzadeh et al. (2018, 2019) 
also proposed to integrate an adversarial loss with the 
standard activity classification loss. But, an adversarial 
loss function can only be used for protecting one 
kind of private information, such as user identity and 
gender. Iwasawa et al. (2017), Malekzadeh et al. (2018), 
and Osia et al. (2020) require the labels of private 
information for adversarial trainings. In Figure 13, z 
and y are sensitive variables. z-predictor just uses f1, 
whereas y-remover uses both f1 and f2.
Zhang et al. (2019) adopted the image style 
transformation to protect all private information at 
once and maintain the desired information being 
inferred normally. The presented approach transforms 
raw sensor data into a new format that has a ‘style’ 
(sensitive information) of random noise and a ‘content’ 
(desired information) of the raw sensor data as shown in 
Figure 14. The pre-trained LossNet is used to define the 
loss functions that measure ‘style’ difference between 
transformed data and random noise and ‘content’ 
difference between transformed data and raw data.
Phan et al. (2016), Abadi et al. (2016), and Papernot 
et al. (2017) used differential privacy for training data 
privacy. Instead of applying differential privacy to the 
query process for large statistical data sets, they used 
differential privacy during machine learning. Phan 
et al. (2016) proposed a privacy preservation encoder, 
deep private auto-encoder (dPA), by dev eloping 
an ε-differential privacy-preserving deep learning 
model. That is, they enforced ε-differential privacy by 
perturbing the objective functions of the traditional 
deep auto-encoder. Abadi et al. (2016) proposed 
differentially private deep models and Papernot et al. 
(2017) utilized differential privacy, which is not specific 
to the learning model.
Tramèr et al. (2016) and Wang and Gong 
(2018) considered the learning model privacy. An 
adversary can infer the model parameters by making 
many queries to the learning model as shown in 
Figure 15. f is the train model data owner has. An 
attacker uses q queries to extract ƒˆ ≈ ƒ. Wang and 
Gong (2018) introduced hyper-parameter stealing 
attacks applicable to a variety of popular machine 
learning algorithms such as ridge regression, logistic 
regression, support vector machine, and neural 
network. Juuti et al. (2019) proposed PRADA to 
protect against the model stealing attack. It analyzes 
the distribution of consecutive API queries and raises 
an alarm when this distribution deviates from benign 
behavior. Kariyappa and Kariyappa (2019) subs-
tantially degrade the accuracy of the attacker’s clone 
model by selectively sending incorrect predic tions 
for attackers’ queries.
The approaches in Table 4 protect privacy by 
securing the entire data set and data processing 
using encryption, anonymity, and isolation. For large 
statistical data sets, differential privacy is applied to 
prevent individual personal information from leaking. 
When neural network is adopted in data processing, 
adversarial training is proposed against adversarial 
examples misleading the learning models. Improving 
the effectiveness of privacy protection using data 
format conversion was also taken into account. In 
addition, differential privacy was applied to data 
and learning models by inserting noise to prevent 
the disclosure of private information during machine 
learning. There were approaches to prevent inference 
or theft of learning models in machine learning.
On the other hand, a membership inference attack 
was mentioned against machine learning models 
Figure 13: The private-feature 
extraction framework (Osia et al., 
2020).
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(Shokri et al., 2017). At the membership inference, 
given a machine learning model and a record, 
an attacker can determine whether a record was 
used as part of the model’s training dataset or not. 
Shokri et al. (2017) showed privacy can be breached 
by membership inference in supervised machine 
learning. They suggested overfitting reduction 
by regularization, and trivial structure in machine 
learning models to mitigate the privacy breach. 
Differentially private models are robust to this attack, 
but the models reduce prediction accuracy for small ε 
values. Adversary training makes learning models be 
robust by prohibiting the models from being biased 
to produce a certain result by adversarial attacks. 
Song et al. (2019) showed that adversarially trained 
models are vulnerable to membership inference 
attacks. Moreover, an increased robustness of 
the adversarially trained model is correlated with 
an increase in the success of the membership 
inference attack due to adversarial generalization. 
Nasr et al. (2018) and Hayes and Ohrimenko (2018) 
design privacy mechanisms to reduce adversarial 
generalization. However, member inference attacks 
require in-depth research related to adversarial 
training.
If the approach that controls privacy is static, it is 
difficult to ensure satisfactory privacy preservation for 
dynamic context-aware applications. Large amounts 
of sensor data and context-aware applications create 
new types of ambiguous privacy issues that make it 
difficult for users to determine sensitive data (Haris 
et al., 2014). Therefore, privacy control should be 
adjusted to the situation, and a method to protect 
privacy should be developed by adapting to data, 
application domain, and data processing technology.
Conclusion
In this study, we focused on privacy-preserving human 
and human activity recognition. With the development 
Figure 14: Collective protection of all sensitive information at once (Zhang et al., 2019).
Figure 15: Model extraction attack (Wang and Gong, 2018).
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of affordable, high-performance cameras and IoT 
devices equipped with various sensors, many appli-
cations are pouring out to provide convenience by 
analyzing various types of big data collected. Big data is 
difficult to find meaningful information until it is analyzed. 
However, the results analyzed by the development of 
computing technologies such as deep learning have 
new security problems. For human and human activity 
awareness, extracting information about a particular 
individual and his activities can cause problems that 
can infringe on privacy. Therefore, privacy-preserving 
approaches are important in human and human activity 
recognition. Because there is no single best solution 
for privacy protection, it should be studied in parallel 
with the expansion of deep learning applications. In 
this paper, privacy-preserving approaches and related 
issues were investigated in cutting-edge research.
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